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Abstract
In this paper I propose a Fictional Dualism model of social robots. The model helps us to understand the human emotional 
reaction to social robots and also acts as a guide for us in determining the significance of that emotional reaction, enabling 
us to better define the moral and legislative rights of social robots within our society. I propose a distinctive position that 
allows us to accept that robots are tools, that our emotional reaction to them can be important to their usefulness, and that this 
emotional reaction is not a direct indicator that robots deserve either moral consideration or rights. The positive framework 
of Fictional Dualism provides us with an understanding of what social robots are and with a plausible basis for our relation-
ships with them as we bring them further into society.
Keywords Social robots · Fictional dualism model · Empathy for social robots · Rights for social robots · Social robots and 
society · Social robots and fiction
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to propose a metaphysical 
framework of social robots that will help us to understand 
the human emotional reaction to them. The framework will 
also act as a guide for us in determining the significance 
of that emotional reaction, enabling us to better define 
the moral and legislative rights of social robots within our 
society.
There is much evidence, both anecdotal and academic, to 
suggest that we react differently to robots than we do to other 
objects.1 This is because robots can interact with humans on 
a social level—sometimes by design but other times as an 
unintended consequence.2 This paper addresses the question: 
should social robots be granted rights on the basis of our 
ability to form an emotional attachment to them?3
The existing literature provides us with a range of 
responses. Darling (2017) and Gerdes (2016) argue, along 
Kantian lines, that permitting harm to social robots in light 
of our ability to become emotionally attached to them could 
be morally problematic. Bryson (2015) takes our propen-
sity to form emotional attachment to robots be a warning to 
humanity regarding the kinds of robots we design, arguing 
that we should reassert the idea of robots as tools and avoid 
creating things that have human-like properties. Gunkel and 
Coeckelbergh (2016) suggest that our emotional engagement 
with robots should encourage us to rethink our justification 
for moral consideration entirely, proposing a ‘relational 
turn’ such that we think less about the intrinsic metaphysical 
properties of robots and more about how we relate to them. 
And Nyholm (2020) outlines a different kind of Kantian 
view according to which our emotional response to social 
robots could be evidence that they present to us as having 
humanity—in such cases we ought not to treat them merely 
as means but instead value the appearance of humanity in 
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1 There is a large and growing body of literature on this topic. See, 
for example, Ashrafian (2015), Breazeal (2002), Coeckelbergh 
(2010), Darling (2016, 2017), Duffy (2003), Gunkel (2018), Hung 
et al. (2019), Sung et al. (2007), Johnson and Verdicchio (2018), Tur-
kle (2010).
2 I use the term ‘social robot’ in a response-dependent way here in 
order to cover robots designed with social interaction in mind and 
also those that elicit social interaction ‘accidentally’. For my purpose 
I do not need this to be a clearly defined domain. However, note that 
having a non-vague way of categorising would become an important 
matter were we to grant rights to social robots.
3 Answering this question will not finalise the matter of robots rights 
as there are other distinct debates around the question of granting 
rights to robots. For example, see Schwitzgebel and Graza (2015) for 
a defence of robot rights when future robots come to acquire certain 
psychological and social properties; Eskens (2017) on the matter of 
rights being withheld until sentience or sapiens is evident; Wallach 
and Allen (2009: 206) on the issue of robot rights being tied to ques-
tions of legal personhood.
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virtue of valuing humanity itself. In this paper I propose a 
distinctive position that allows us to accept (i) that robots 
are tools, (ii) that our emotional reaction to them can be 
important to their usefulness, and (iii) that this emotional 
reaction is not a direct indicator that robots deserve either 
moral consideration or rights. My argument is a philosophi-
cal one. I focus on unargued for assumptions in the existing 
literature, critique the feasibility of those assumptions, and 
propose alternative ways of thinking of our engagement with 
robots, using analogies and argument to justify my proposed 
framework. My position is further motivated by two risks. 
The first risk is one that I see arising from the granting of 
legal and moral rights to social robots, that this may prove 
to be practically problematic and unnecessarily limiting. The 
second risk has a similar end but arises from attempts to 
stem the emotional attachment that we can form to robots, 
again limiting their usefulness. Ultimately, I am proposing 
a balanced view that allows us to accept that some robots 
will best achieve their purpose by drawing emotional attach-
ment from us whilst also allowing us to keep that emotional 
attachment from having significant moral import.
In this paper I provide a distinct conceptual framework 
for our engagement with social robots. In section two, I con-
sider the moral significance of our emotional attachment 
to social robots according to various models and theories 
in recent literature. In section three, I present an alternative 
model of social robots, the metaphysical model of Fictional 
Dualism. This model provides us with an explanation of our 
emotional attachment to social robots, whilst also clarifying 
the significance of that attachment. The positive framework 
of Fictional Dualism provides us with a way of conceptualis-
ing social robots and a basis for our relationships with them, 
as we bring them further into society. Finally, I note that 
the granting of rights to social robots would significantly 
restrict their usefulness and, as such, should not be under-
taken unnecessarily.
Human empathy and its significance
The therapeutic baby seal, PARO (Physically-Assistive 
Robots), is an example of a robot designed with social 
interaction in mind. It has touch sensors that allow it to 
respond to being stroked and held, its audio sensors allow 
it to respond to verbal triggers and it can learn to adjust its 
behaviour in response to its sensory interactions with human 
companions. PARO has been found to have a number of ben-
efits within the healthcare system including reducing stress 
of both the patient and the caregiver, improving patient moti-
vation and relaxation and improving patient socialisation. 
(Hung et al., 2019) Its pet-like design is intended to elicit an 
emotional response and to engender attachment. There are 
further examples of entities designed with social engage-
ment in mind:
We are already seeing some highly positive use cases 
of engaging people with social robot technology. […] 
The NAO Next Generation robot is successfully being 
used to help engage children with autism. Preliminary 
studies show that even simple robotic companionship 
can motivate people to reach goals, for example to lose 
weight twice as effectively as with other methods. The 
possibilities for health, education, and other areas are 
endless. (Darling, 2016: 225)
Other robots have been found to elicit a significant emo-
tional response from humans despite such a response not 
being an intended feature of their design and, in some cases, 
being a detrimental feature. There are reports of people feel-
ing distressed when their Roomba vacuum cleaner gets stuck 
in a corner, of giving their Roomba a name and striking up 
conversations with it. (Ja-Young et al., 2007) Here, it appears 
that Roomba has been found to take on the role of household 
pet, a consequence that was surely unintended by its design-
ers. It was not designed with a face or any other human 
or animal-like features and it does not communicate. The 
anthropomorphism of Roomba would seem to be an unex-
pected win for the designers, assuming that such a response 
has a positive effect on brand attachment.
A less welcome unintended design consequence of the 
anthropomorphism of robots was discovered when the US 
military introduced a testing programme for a new land mine 
robot. The robot had an insect design which allowed it to 
traverse uneven terrain. When it came across a landmine 
and the device detonated, the robot lost a leg. But, having 
more than one leg, the robot was able to continue searching 
for land mines on its other legs. Despite the many benefits 
afforded by such a robot the testing exercise was cancelled. 
According to Joel Garreau’s (2007) Washington Post article, 
the colonel in charge of the exercise called it off as “[he] just 
could not stand the pathos of watching the burned, scarred 
and crippled machine drag itself forward on its last leg. This 
test, he charged, was inhumane.”
Numerous studies have shown that when robots replicate 
or mimic the behaviour of living things—when they react 
to our interactions, when they move in animal-like ways, 
when they have familiar facial expressions, when ‘framing 
conditions’ are right—this provokes an attachment in us 
and a corresponding emotional response (Birnbaum et al., 
2016; Coeckelbergh et al., 2016; Collins et al., 2013; Tur-
kle, 2010).4 The attachment can be surprisingly strong. The 
4 Darling (2017) reports on an experiment which demonstrates that 
giving a name or a back story to a robot i.e. framing, encourages 
anthropomorphism.
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developer of Kismet (MIT Lab), Cynthia Breazeal, reported 
experiencing “a sharp sense of loss” when she parted ways 
with her creation at the end of the project (Breazeal, 2002).5
Kate Darling points particularly to the human distress 
reaction to the damage of social robots. Talking of her own 
social experiment she states:
I conducted a workshop with my colleague Hannes 
Gassert at the LIFT13 conference in Geneva, Swit-
zerland. In the workshop, groups of participants were 
given Pleos—cute robotic dinosaurs that are roughly the 
size of small cats. After interacting with the robots and 
performing various tasks with them, the groups were 
asked to tie up, strike, and “kill” their Pleos. Drama 
ensued, with many of the participants refusing to “hurt” 
the robots, and even physically protecting them from 
being struck by fellow group members. One of the par-
ticipants removed her Pleo’s battery, later sheepishly 
admitting that she had instinctively wanted to “spare it 
the pain.” Although the groups knew we had purchased 
the robots to be destroyed, we could only persuade them 
to sacrifice one Pleo in the end. While everyone in the 
room was fully aware that the robot was just simulating 
its pain, most participants giggled nervously and felt a 
distinct sense of discomfort when it whimpered while 
it was being broken.” Darling (2016: 225)6
Given this evidence from a variety of different reliable 
sources, we can take it to be incontrovertible that humans 
can have strong emotional reactions to robots. The question 
is, could these emotional reactions have any bearing on the 
question of robot rights?
For Bryson, absolutely—and that is why we should take 
care to minimise anthropomorphising features when designing 
them. For Nyholm, if our emotional responses are a reaction to 
the appearance of humanity in the object then, for humanity’s 
sake, this could lead to robots rights. According to relational 
views, such as those proposed by Gunkel and Coeckelbergh 
(2017), yes, because the call for robot rights need not arise 
from advances in technology around machine consciousness 
or sentience –they could arise from advances in our social 
interactions with robots and in particular in the way that these 
social interactions change our perspective of them from being 
tools, to something akin to companions. Coeckelbergh says,
‘My suggestion is that we can permit ourselves to 
remain agnostic about what ‘really’ goes on ‘in’ there, 
and focus on the ‘outer’, the interaction, and in par-
ticular on how this interaction is co-shaped and co-
constituted by how A[rtificial] A[gent]s appear to us, 
humans’. (2009, 188)
For Darling, our emotional reaction towards the destruc-
tion of social robots is a significant factor in determining 
morally permissible behaviour towards these objects within 
our society.7 She builds on the fact that humans display emo-
tion if a robot appears to be damaged, hurt or distressed. She 
makes the case that our emotional reaction to the harming 
of social robots is an indicator that we find this behaviour 
morally repugnant and that, as such, we should give consid-
eration to the case for preparing new legislation that extends 
rights to social robots.
None of this is to say that social robots are the only objects 
that we have an emotional attachment to. We are likely to be 
emotionally attached to objects in our possession that have a 
sentimental value, such as wedding rings or to an item left in the 
will of a beloved relative. Also, we sometimes become attached 
to other objects that we own because we have a ‘history’ with 
them which leads to our becoming emotionally invested. For 
example, you might be emotionally attached to your bike, to 
the plants that you care for and to your favourite pair of shoes. 
To focus in on the issue at hand and distinguish the feelings 
that we have towards social robots from the feelings that we 
have towards other objects, the emotion that we will highlight is 
empathy. We can have emotional attachment to wedding rings, 
beloved bikes and plants, and we can feel sadness when they are 
damaged, but we do not feel empathy towards them. I suggest 
that it is empathy that marks the difference in the way that we 
react to social robots from other objects.8
Engagement with social robots is fairly new to humans. 
We are only just beginning to work out the place that such 
objects will have in our society and the significance of our 
relationship to them and there are a number of ways that we 
5 See Garreau (2007) and Carpenter (2015) for further evidence of 
soldiers developing unexpectedly close emotional relationships with 
military robots.
6 Note that Darling uses language that may constitute framing by 
asking them to ‘kill’ their Pleo, ‘kill’ being an anthropomorphising 
term.
7 See Rodogno (2016) for a thorough consideration of the claim, ulti-
mately refuted, that our reaction can be dismissed as sentimental.
8 There are important cases in which these two worlds of emotion 
overlap. For example, if a social robot is your property you are likely 
to develop emotional attachment towards it based on an investment 
of time and experience with the object, in addition to feeling empa-
thy towards it if it is harmed. This leads to a whole other dimension 
of questions around implications of crime towards social robots that 
are beloved in this way. For example, in the current legal system, 
when a criminal steals a bike, the punishment for the crime is the 
same regardless of the emotional attachment of the lawful owner. But 
if someone purposefully ‘kills’ a social robot that is a beloved fam-
ily member, it is not clear whether this should be treated as a straight 
case of the damage of property or whether there is some additional 
crime related to the significance that the social robot had for the fam-
ily. This is a matter for a further paper. Here, for clarity, we are limit-
ing ourselves to considering the basic case—the emotional reaction to 
the harming of a social robot that is not also an item of your property 
that you are emotionally invested in. There may be other emotions 




can consider our attachment to social robots, drawing on 
analogies with existing relationships. The model we choose 
will have an impact on how we might understand the social 
and moral significance of our emotional reactions. One 
model, common in the literature, is to draw on our relation-
ships with animals.9 It is easy to see why this might appear 
to be fruitful. The attachment of the soldier to their landmine 
social robot may appear to them to be very similar to the 
attachment that they felt for animals that they had worked 
with in the line of duty. Likewise, the response that we have 
when the Roomba is stuck under the sofa may appear to us 
to be very similar to the response that we had when we saw 
our pet gerbil get trapped in a part of her running tube.
However, from the fact that these emotional responses 
may feel the same to us, we need not conclude that the trig-
gers—the animals, the social robots—either play the same 
role for us in society or deserve the same rights as each 
other. That is, before deciding that our emotional response 
should determine the guidelines for our interactions with 
social robots within society we need to ensure it provides a 
solid foundation for such a move. As Johnson and Verdic-
chio put it, while acknowledging an apparent similarity in 
our emotional response to social robots and animals, “[…] 
whether this capacity to elicit anthropomorphization and 
attachment is sufficient to justify using one type of entity as 
a model for treatment of the other is quite a different mat-
ter.” (2018: 293).
We have some evidence to suggest that various anthro-
pomorphic conditions—autonomous movements, human or 
animal-like appearance, or framing conditions—lead us to 
see certain objects in a particular way. We might, in light 
of this evidence, allow that when conditions are right we 
are perceiving these objects as we perceive living things. 
However, even if we permit that assumption, it is a further 
step to conclude that we categorise these entities alongside 
living things in any respect. Distinct objects can be different 
yet present to us in the same way.
With social robots, there is a further feature that might 
push us in the direction of action: we have not only a percep-
tion of a life-like thing but also an accompanying emotional 
reaction. However, and this a crucial point for this paper, we 
need to see this emotional reaction as having moral signifi-
cance in order for it to lead to action. In pushing for social 
robots to be afforded moral status on the basis of our emo-
tional response to them, a theorist is implicitly assuming that 
the response is morally significant.
Yet, while it is perhaps true that the emotional response 
that we have when we perceive a social robot being harmed 
seems indistinguishable in kind from the emotional response 
that we have when we perceive a living thing being harmed, 
it is a further step to conclude that this has the same sig-
nificance—that we are warranted in categorising the social 
robot alongside other things that provoke the same response, 
when considering rights. While it may be the case that the 
emotional response that the Colonel has when the land mine 
robot has a leg blown off is indistinguishable in kind from 
the emotional response that he has when a land mine sniffer 
dog suffers the same fate, the Colonel need not categorise 
the objects as the same or even similar kinds. Even if the 
emotional response feels the same, the relation is arguably 
different in other relevant and important ways. Below I pro-
pose a metaphysics of social robots that helps to frame both 
the emotional response and the sense that it is relevantly 
different.
A fictional dualism model of social robots
I propose a theory of the metaphysics of social robots that 
provides a useful framework for understanding our rela-
tionship with them. Rather than thinking of social robots as 
analogous to animals in our environment or as tools to be 
interacted with in a detached way, I propose that we conceive 
of them as mechanical objects with fictional overlays. This 
dualist framework allow us to agree that on the one hand, 
the object—the Roomba, PARO, the land mine robot—is 
simply a mechanical device, whilst also accommodating the 
fact that certain features of the robot—the way it moves, its 
cosmetic design, the way it communicates—encourage us 
not simply to anthropomorphise but to engage in character 
creation. I am proposing that, in the kinds of interactions 
described above, when we interact with a social robot we are 
interacting with an embodied fictional character. And that is 
a new experience for us.
I propose that the relation that we stand in towards social 
robots, when we feel an empathetic emotional attachment, is 
a relation to an object with a fictional overlay. This is alien 
to us. Most adults are familiar with what we can think of 
as passive character engagement. When we read a book or 
watch a movie the character is laid out for us. The creator 
of the character is the author or screenwriter and, although 
there is some room for us to interpret elements of the charac-
ter’s nature, the role for imagination is limited. The character 
is depicted for us by its actions and dialogue and by how it 
engages with other characters. Through this we are familiar 
with a kind of emotional relationship with, or towards, fic-
tional characters.
Social robot interaction takes us onto a scale of what 
we can think of as active character engagement. Active 
character engagement at its most basic is where we create 
a character for a non-animated object. Children engage in 
this form of active character engagement regularly through 
9 For theorists what draw on the animal analogy see Darling (2017) 
and also Coeckelbergh (2010), Sullins (2011) and Ashrafian (2015).
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game play. They construct a fictional character and a fic-
tional series of cognitive activities for a favourite teddy or 
toy and, in their minds, they give the toy a psychological life. 
The teddy becomes a confidant and play-mate. Unlike the 
child’s human play-mates, whose psychological life interacts 
with their physical bodies in the usual ways, the character 
that the child has created for the toy is entirely distinct from 
the object. We can think of the character as an overlay that is 
projected on to the object by the child. The projected charac-
ter comes entirely from the child’s imagination. The nature 
of the character that the child creates may be guided some-
what by the appearance of the toy but, other than that, the toy 
contributes nothing to the development of its own character.
In our interactions with social robots we are in an unfa-
miliar hybrid situation.10 The base for our engagement is 
depicted for us, sometimes intentionally other times not, by 
the creators—in the Roomba and landmine robot it is there 
in the object’s autonomous movements, in PARO it is in a 
more sophisticated combination of movement, look, feel and 
sounds. But the character itself, imaginations of Roomba’s 
aims, developments of PARO’s nature as a being, we build 
in our minds very much like a child does with its teddy. 
Through our engagement with the social robot we create for 
it both a fictional character and a fictional mental life which 
become part of the robot in our thinking. If we are inclined 
to talk to Roomba it is because, for us, it has a fictional 
overlay that would welcome our conversation. If we feel pity 
for Roomba when it gets stuck under the sofa, it is because 
it has a fictional overlay that has needs and desires that are 
being frustrated when it is stuck.11 Our emotional response 
to the ‘harming’ of the object is in large part—although 
as discussed in the next section, perhaps not entirely—a 
response to the harming of the fictional character. In our 
fictional overlay, the landmine robot feels pain and fear when 
a leg is blown off. The perceived trials and tribulations of 
the fictional character, engaged with as an overlay to the 
object, trigger an emotional response very much like the 
emotional response we would have when engaging with a 
book or movie in which a depicted character feels pain or 
distress. A social robot that displays pain behaviour, fear 
behaviour or aggressive behaviour will elicit an emotional 
response from us partly because it has gained a character 
with a psychological life in our mind.
As we engage with the social robot we can easily stop 
seeing it for what it is, an object displaying behaviour that 
encourages a certain fiction. Instead, we have a tendency 
to react like the child does with its toy, seeing the fictional 
character as an inherent part of the object. Once the object 
and the character are intertwined in our imagination, it 
requires some effort to separate them.
According to the Fictional Dualism model, the anthro-
pomorphism of social robots is to be understood, not as us 
classifying the social robot as animal-like, but as the creation 
of a fictional character. An understanding of this metaphysi-
cal framework moves us away from the temptation to equate 
our emotional response and its social significance with that 
of our relationship with animals or other humans and instead 
to consider the social significance of our emotional response 
to fiction.
If our emotional reaction to social robots is analogous 
to our emotional reactions to fiction, how are we to under-
stand its significance?12 Conceived of along the model of 
Fictional Dualism, our empathy is directed towards a fiction 
and the question of rights does not arise. This is because we 
allow ourselves to feel strong emotional responses toward 
fictions without moral repercussions around rights. Few 
would argue, for example, that the emotional response we 
feel towards fiction could be a motivating factor in a push for 
legislation preventing authors and screenwriters from creat-
ing works in which fictional characters are harmed, where 
this harm causes emotional distress to audience members. 
This is surely because the distress that is felt, while very 
real, is in some sense less significant both personally and 
socially. Even while actively considering the tears of the 
audience, while watching the immense emotional upset a 
movie can cause, we are not inclined to use that negative 
emotional response to motivate protective action.13 This 
indicates that, although our emotional reactions to fiction 
come about through the correlations that we draw between 
fiction and real life, they do not follow through with real life 
consequences.
The Fictional Dualism model explains the emotional 
response that we can have towards robots by identifying as 
its source the fictional overlay that individuals may apply to 
the robot. At the same time, the question of what is going 
on ‘inside’ the robot continues to play an important role. It 
10 Turkle (2015) notes with concern the difference between imagi-
nary play with stuffed animals and imaginary play with robots. 
Unlike the stuffed toy, the robot presents itself to a child as an object 
that can feel emotion.
11 It is an interesting question whether a process of fictionalisation 
also accounts for some of our interactions with animals, when we 
create an inner life of motivations and emotions that may bear little 
resemblance to the animal’s actual psychological life.
12 See Rodogno (2016) for a detailed comparison between the para-
dox of fictional emotion and our emotional response to robots in 
order to argue against our emotion being classed as sentimental.
13 We do have age ratings for movies and video games and this is 
perhaps evidence of some concern around the indirect impact on chil-
dren of seeing violence depicted to fictional characters. I consider 
how we might understand claims of indirect harm arising from seeing 




is the answer to the question of what is going on inside the 
robot that currently allows us to reap the full social benefits 
of our engagement, without the need to confer moral agency 
or rights.14
Fictional Dualism differs substantially from the models 
considered above. The Kantian views of Darling and Ger-
des would have us take our emotional engagement with 
social robots to indicate a moral duty to them, even if only 
to protect our own humanity. Nyholm would take emotional 
engagement to be evidence of the appearance of human-
ity in the object—something which should be protected. 
Coeckelburgh and Gunkel’s relational turn encourages us, 
not only to place more importance on the social role that 
robots can play, but also to take that role to be morally sig-
nificant. And Bryson highlights the social role that robots 
can play alongside a warning that such engagement should 
be limited before it damages human-to-human interactions. 
If our emotional response to robots is understood as a reac-
tion to a fiction, as is proposed in the Fictional Dualism 
model, it can be developed and utilised without fear and 
without acting as a motivator for robots being afforded legal 
protection or rights.
Repulsion, distaste, morality and the law
I have proposed a dualist theory of social robots according to 
which the object and its fictional overlay are distinct entities. 
We considered the role that our attachment to the fictional 
overlay might play in our emotional response to the damage 
of a social robot. The analogy with the social significance 
of our emotional response to fiction would suggest that we 
do not take preventative action to stop the damage to social 
robots on the basis of our emotional response to its fictional 
character.
However, there is another factor involved in our disquiet 
around the harming of social robots that is worth consid-
ering.15 In the straight fiction case, certainly in literature, 
there is no damage to any object at all. That is, not only is 
the fiction unable to experience pain, there is no body to be 
physically damaged. When James Bond is stabbed in the 
leg with a stiletto knife, there is no real-life damage. And 
even in the movie, while it might look as if the actor’s body 
is being damaged, we can remind ourselves that this, too, 
is fake. Not so with damage to the social robot. If a group 
of teens decide to ‘torture’ a social robot by removing its 
limbs or by dropping it from a height, an object is damaged. 
If Roomba is purposefully trapped in the corner for a sig-
nificant period, it won’t feel anxiety or stress at its situation, 
but it may well overheat and become damaged. So, although 
we should not take our emotional response to the fictional 
overlay of social robots to demand social or legal reform, 
damage of the object itself could be considered as a potential 
trigger of anxiety.
The emotional reaction we feel can be distinct from any 
concerns regarding the loss of functionality of the object. 
Often, we just do not like seeing things being destroyed.16 
It is unpleasant to watch the windows being broken, even if 
we know that the house is due to be demolished. The need-
less damage of something is generally abhorrent to us and it 
can cause distress, repulsion, anxiety and fear to those wit-
nessing it. Given that social robots can mimic the emotional 
response of a living thing when damaged, it is certainly con-
ceivable that they will become a target for ‘torture’. Even 
laying aside the emotional response to the fiction that we 
identified above, witnessing the bodily damage of the social 
robot is something that is likely to repulse us.
But human repulsion cannot straightforwardly be taken 
as evidence that a particular behaviour is immoral or should 
be banned. There are all kinds of acts that fall under the 
category of distasteful and repulsive but which, arguably, do 
not involve direct harm to another individual. Some we have 
deemed to be indirectly harmful and have made them illegal 
but others we permit to varying degrees.17
We can call Category One such acts that can be con-
sidered distasteful but are fully permitted. There are many 
things that fall under this category—things that a high pro-
portion of society will find distasteful or even repulsive but 
which are fully permitted. Examples here might include 
speaking with one’s mouth full of food, wearing clothing 
that is considered inappropriate, having extreme levels of 
tattoos or other forms of body art, ‘deviant’ consensual sex-
ual practices, drinking alcohol at non-acceptable times of 
the day and extreme drunkenness. These are things that may 
cause social anxiety or cause some individuals to be uncom-
fortable but which are not likely to be banned in any liberal 
17 I do not attempt to consider or categorise all areas of legislation 
that can cover acts that may be considered as causing indirect harm.
15 There is a different, but related, argument in favour of extending 
rights to social robots. This is the argument that permitting the harm 
of social robots has the secondary effect of damaging the morality of 
society. See Levy (2009), Darling (2016). The idea here is that, if we 
allow the harm of social robots, we are teaching society that violence 
or harm is acceptable. That argument is worth engaging with. But in 
order to engage with it we must first have clarity regarding the sig-
nificance of our emotional reaction to the harming of social robots, 
the aim of this paper, for understanding how to frame that reaction is 
crucial in determining the impact on broader society.
16 See Fiery Cushman et  al. (2012: 2) who proposes that negative 
reaction to harmful behaviour can be explained by ‘action aversion’ 
where an aversive response may be triggered simply by the basic per-
ceptual and mechanical properties of an action, regardless of consid-
erations of its outcome.
14 In the future, as technology develops, that might change. See foot-
note 3.
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society. Although they might cause distress to some, we 
generally understand that they are to be permitted because 
permitting them recognises the more fundamental good of 
civil liberty. No one is being harmed, except for perhaps the 
individual themselves and that is with their own consent.
We can call Category Two such acts that are considered 
distasteful and can veer into impermissible. These, unlike 
the examples above, may lead to legal intervention. Exam-
ples here include swearing, speaking loudly or shouting, and 
public displays of affection. Swearing is generally accept-
able, but a member of the public swearing at people in a 
populated public place could be cautioned for disorderly 
behaviour. Again, speaking loudly or shouting can be accept-
able in some circumstances but it can also veer into a distur-
bance of the peace. And, while we are unlikely to complain 
if a couple exchange a kiss, our distaste can grow with the 
level of affection shown in public and can veer into illegality 
under indecent behaviour laws.
Category Three behaviours are those that are considered 
distasteful and are always impermissible. These tend to be 
anti-social behaviours such as public urination, public inde-
cency, soliciting and loitering.
Where an anti-social behaviour does fall under the purview 
of legislation it is likely to be because an argument can be 
made for significant indirect harm. The relevant question for 
our purposes is: which category does the destruction of social 
robots fall into? Can restrictive legislation be introduced on 
the back of a significant indirect harm? Understanding social 
robots in line with the Fictional Dualism model detailed 
above, it is difficult to motivate the case for significant indirect 
harm. We can agree that onlookers may feel some mixture of 
negative emotion and empathy if they see a social robot being 
damaged but, as detailed above, the theory of Fictional Dual-
ism provides an explanation of this reaction. The emotional 
reaction is compatible with an awareness that the robot is an 
object that cannot feel distress. While we do feel the emotional 
pull of empathy from the fictional overlay, we are also aware 
that the ‘pain’ reaction of the robot is no more an indication 
of pain than would be witnessed in a play fight. That is, we 
can become aware that our empathy is grounded in the fiction, 
not in any aspect of feeling that the robot itself might access. 
The human reaction of empathy does not reasonably, in these 
cases, lead to lasting distress.
This is not to say that destructive behaviour is not abhor-
rent. As noted above, the needless destruction of any object 
is generally repulsive to us and the choosing as a target an 
object that appears to be lifelike is even more distasteful. 
Still, once we accept the Fictional Dualism model of social 
robots, as opposed to the domesticated animal model, the 
case for significant indirect harm is lost.
Conclusion and final observations
The dual aspect that we can toggle between—the emotional 
pull of the fictional overlay on one side and the knowledge 
that the entity is a physical object without feelings on the 
other—is something to be embraced. It provides us with the 
proven social benefits that emotional engagement with robots 
can bring, whilst giving us no moral reason to grant them 
protective rights. That we can develop emotional attachments 
to robots is a useful feature of humans, having great poten-
tial for increased societal benefits from our engagement with 
robots. The Fictional Dualism model provides a framework 
that allows for and explains the propensity for attachment to 
robots, without such attachment being dismissed as irrational, 
overly sentimental or dangerous. It also provides us with the 
means to stop short of granting rights to robots on the basis of 
that emotional attachment, as we can screen off the fictional 
overlay and remind ourselves that, physically, the robot is a 
mechanical, non-moral, entity.18
In this paper we have considered a Fictional Dualism 
model of social robots. Conceiving of social robots in this 
way makes it less likely that they will be granted rights. We 
might wonder why that is such a welcome outcome—surely 
rights are good things and, as such, more of them can only 
be encouraged? Not necessarily. Consider the social robot 
that we started with, PARO. If we were to promote a model 
under which PARO was to be granted rights, it would likely 
become useless for its intended purpose. The whole appeal 
of PARO is that it can provide comfort and companion-
ship for individuals who are not capable of taking care of 
a living thing. If PARO were granted the rights of a living 
thing, there would need to be some regulation in place to 
ensure that it was not being abused. This would be a very 
unwelcome regulatory hurdle in an area of healthcare where 
innovation, and not regulation, is urgently required. And, to 
what end?
It might be objected that the philosophical views consid-
ered here are simply different ways of thinking of the same 
object and that surely this alone cannot mark a significant 
moral difference. But in this case it can. We are just begin-
ning to invite social robots into our lives and, arguably, it 
is up to us to determine how to categorise these entities as 
they become part of society. Johnson and Verdicchio press 
this point:
How humans think about robots, especially human-
oid social robots, is not predetermined. The process 
is contingent and there are advantages and disadvan-
tages of going one way or another. Reflection on the 
18 Again, this is not to say that rights won’t come for other reasons—
just not for this one.
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process of assimilation while it is taking place and 
self-consciously trying to shape what is made of such 
robots has the potential to help ensure that robots of 
the future will be more socially beneficial. (2018, 291)
Advances in technology may yet come that will blur the 
existing boundary between living and non-living, conscious 
and not-conscious entities. Until that time, a Fictional Dualism 
model provides us with the most appropriate framework for 
understanding the place that social robots occupy in our society.
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